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In 1968 the union movement in higher education was launched on the CUNY
campuses in New York when CUNY held the first academic labor union election on an
“integrated, heterogeneous, multi-campus system” (Ladd and Lipset 1973). In the nearly
five decades since that historic election, unionization has grown to cover more than a
third of all public four-year institutions and 40 percent of faculty at those public
institutions (see Figure 1). While unionization is more common at larger institutions,
Figure 1 illustrates that even among the smallest public institutions, unionization has
increased over time.
Figure 1 here

Yet, despite the benefit of time and the growing number of university faculty who have
organized, there is arguably less consensus today over unionization’s impact on
university effectiveness than there was in 1968. Today, as then, faculty unions are under
fire from legislators, the media, and the public (Davis 2011). The repeated attacks have
fueled reductions in state subsidies for higher education, curtailment or elimination of
collective bargaining, establishment of so-called “charter” or “enterprise” universities
(Martin and Samels 2005), and weakening or elimination of tenure (McPherson, M. and
M.O. Schapiro. 1999). This research cuts through the often-hyperbolic rhetoric to
examine empirically the relationship between unionization and the performance of public
universities.
There are, of course, multiple ways to assess university performance. At the
same time data limitations mean that, even if one could reach consensus on the perfect
performance measure, it is unlikely that the perfect database would exist. Studies of
unionization in higher education typically focus on unions’ impact on individual
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attributes such as compensation (Birnbaum 1974 & 1976; Brown and Courtenay 1977;
Hendrick et al. 2011), working conditions (Wickens 2008), job security and job
satisfaction (Ponak and Thompson 1984; Mayer 2011), decision-making and governance
(Porter 2012) and academic freedom (DeCew 2003). Relatively few studies look at the
impact of unionization on the performance of institutions as a whole. An exception is
Kim Cameron’s 1982 article, “The Relationship between Faculty Unionism and
Organizational Effectiveness.”
Cameron’s study of 41 four-year institutions in the northeast concluded with two
opposing possible relationships between unionization and organizational effectiveness.
One possibility is that unionization reduces university effectiveness by centralizing the
organization, imposing rigid personnel structures, and reducing the organization’s
flexibility. Cameron (1982) writes, “When organizational energy is expended in
rationalizing the organization through organizing and bargaining activities, less energy is
available for the pursuit of multidimensional effectiveness or the satisfaction of multiple
constituencies” (20). At the same time, Cameron’s work also points to an opposing
possibility: far from reducing an organization’s effectiveness, unions are likely to occur
in universities that have shown to be dysfunctional. Indeed, it is often an ineffective
administration that prompts unionization. As a result, Cameron acknowledges that
unionism could be a “proactive move to improve organizational performance and
institutional interaction” (21). Because he had only cross-sectional data, Cameron was
unable to determine which possibility was correct. This research, at its core, takes up
Cameron’s central question regarding unionization’s impact on institutional performance
but this time with cross-sectional time series data from the National Center for Education
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Statistic’s Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) spanning 23 years
and 431 public four-year institutions1.
The paper is divided into four sections. Methodology and data are presented in
Section I. Section II turns to the influence of unionization on higher education efficiency.
Section III examines the influence of unionization on higher education effectiveness.
Both empirical sections present and test several hypotheses derived from the scholarly
literature. A concluding Section IV discusses a possible explanation for the research
findings by examining the influence of unionization on a university’s budgetary priorities,
i.e. the percent of the budget devoted to instruction vs. administration.

I. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Scholarship on unionization and higher education typically uses cross-sectional
data analysis. However, since cross-sectional data offer only a snapshot in time, such
approaches are unable to capture change in their models. This research addresses the
problem by using time series cross-sectional (TSCS) regression analysis to examine the
effect of unionization on changes in university performance and behavior. A panel data
regression differs from a regular time-series or cross-section regression in that it has a
double subscript on its variables:
yit =αi + xit 'β +εit , i = 1, …, N; t = 1, …, T (1)
The i subscript denotes the cross-section dimension (universities) and t denotes the timeseries dimension. Most of the panel data applications utilize a one-way error component
model for the disturbances, with: uit =αi +εit.
1

The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) consists of nine interrelated survey
components collected each year from all institutions that participate in any federal financial assistance
program authorized by Title IV or the Higher Education Act of 1965.
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TSCS data are characterized by repeated observations on the same fixed political
units. In this case the units are 432 public four-year universities reporting data annually
for 23 years.2 The two main options one has in TSCS is to analyze the impact of an
independent variable on a dependent variable within a group, i.e. what happens to
university performance when a university switches its union status? This is known is as
“Fixed Effects.” Alternatively, one can use “Random Effect” which analyzes the impact
of an independent variable across a group, i.e. what is the average effect of unionization
on university performance?
Random effects is used in this analysis for three reasons: 1) the core research
questions center around unionization’s impact on university performance generally and
not with respect to any specific university; 2) several variables in the analysis (University
Selectivity and Carnegie Classification) do not vary over time and thus they would fall
out of the analysis were we to use fixed effects; and third, the number of universities that
switch union status during the time period is relatively small and thus making it difficult
to analyze the impact of a switch in union status. Using random effects allows us to
determine the average effect of unionization across four-year public institutions not what
would happen if a single university switched its union status.
The data for this research come from the Delta Cost Project, a research
organization that has developed a cross-state longitudinal database from the Integrated
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) data at the National Center for
Educational Statistics. The value added of the Delta Cost Project’s database is that it
enables one to evaluate variables over time, and put information in context through
2

Beck (2001) notes that TSCS data are distinct from panel data, which are repeated cross-section data, but
the units are sampled and they are typically observed only a few times. TSCS units are fixed; there is no
sampling scheme for the units.
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comparison with patterns in other states (Delta Cost Project 2013).
To maintain a narrow focus, I exclude vocational schools, medical schools and
public 2-year institutions. And, because of the Supreme Court’s NLRB v. Yeshiva
University (1980) decision, private institutions are also excluded from the database3. The
432public universities over 23 years generate approximately 9,461 observations.
Variables used in the analysis are described in Appendix 1.
Dependent variables. I explore the relationship between unionization and
performance along two fronts that reflect different values. The first value is efficiency.
Are universities without unions more efficient than universities with unions? Two
different measures of university costs and expenses are used to capture efficiency. The
first measure is total spending on direct educational costs including spending on
instruction, student services, and the education share of spending on central academic and
administrative support, and operations and maintenance. A second measure of efficiency
is total education and general expenditures referred in IPEDS as “core expenses.” The
measure includes expenditures on instruction, research, public service, academic support,
student services, institutional support, operations and maintenance, and scholarships and
fellowships.
I also measure university performance in terms of effectiveness: How well does
the university fulfill its educational mission regardless of cost? While no single measure
can easily capture the mission of an institution, state legislators increasingly use
3

The Supreme Court held that the implied exemption from National Labor Relations Act coverage for socalled managerial employees applied to faculty members at Yeshiva, because their authority over
University academic policy was nearly absolute. While it did not prohibit unionization at private
institutions, the decision makes it extremely difficult for faculty in private institutions to bargain
collectively.
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outcomes such as completions and graduation rates as proxies for effectiveness. Three
outcome measures are used to capture effectiveness:
Graduation rates. Proportion of full-time, first-time, degree/certificate-seeking
undergraduate students graduating within 150 percent of normal time4;
Degrees. Number of degrees conferred per 100 full-time enrolled (FTEs) students
by a college, university, or other postsecondary education institution as official
recognition for the successful completion of a program of studies;
Completions. The total number of completions (awards, certificates, and degrees)
granted per 100 full time equivalent students enrolled. 5

Independent variables. In addition to typically relying on cross-sectional
analysis, studies of wages or costs in higher education often fail to control for cost-ofliving differences across states. Were unionization rates equally distributed across the
country, the variation in the cost of living would not bias the results. But because
unionization is positively correlated with living costs, for example, estimates of union
impacts that omit this relationship overstate the impact of unionization (Hendrick et al.
2011).
A second limitation of earlier work is a lack of attention to state economic and
political variables. Studies that examine the influence of unionization on higher
education do not typically control for a state’s economic or political context. This is
somewhat surprising since comparative state policy research routinely finds that the

4

Normal Time to Completion - The amount of time necessary for a student to complete all requirements
for a degree or certificate according to the institution's catalog. This is typically 4 years (8 semesters or
trimesters, or 12 quarters, excluding summer terms) for a bachelor's degree in a standard term-based
institution; 2 years (4 semesters or trimesters, or 6 quarters, excluding summer terms) for an associate's
degree in a standard term-based institution; and the various scheduled times for certificate programs.
5
In IPEDs these data are reported by level (associate's, bachelor's, master's, doctor's, and firstprofessional), as well as by length of program for some. Institutions report all degrees and other awards
conferred during an entire academic year, from July 1 of one calendar year through June 30 of the
following year.
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political ideology of state policy makers and the economic health of the state influence
the priorities of state government.
Lack of attention to state institutional difference is also a limitation of past
scholarship on higher education. Knott and Payne (2004) develop a classification of
higher education structures across states and show that such structures can influence the
behavior of colleges and universities. They find, for example, higher education
institutions have more resources in those states in which statewide boards are more
decentralized and have fewer regulatory powers. Again, if unionization rates were
distributed equally across states than institutional differences might not matter. However,
if unionization is concentrated in states that cede discretion over financial matters to
colleges and universities, then ignoring this relationship may overstate the impact of
unionization.
I address the limitation of previous research by controlling for the following
independent variables:
Size of institution. A categorical variable the divides student population into five
quintiles coded 1-5 and labeled “very small”, “small”, “medium”, “large”, and
“very large”. The values vary over time because they reflect the relative
population for any given year.
Carnegie 2005 Classification. The 2005 Carnegie Classification includes all
colleges and universities in the United States that are degree-granting and
accredited by an agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education. This
variable does not vary over time.
Selectivity. Measured in terms of the number of students who apply divided by
the number of students admitted. Admission and application information in the
Delta Cost Project, does not cover all 23 years. I, therefore, use data for 2009 and
assume that selectivity (like the Carnegie Classification) is relatively stable over
time.
Cost-of living adjustments. An annual cost of living index for the American states.
(Source: William Berry http://mailer.fsu.edu/~wberry/garnet-wberry/a.html).
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Unionization. The Center for Collective Bargaining in Higher Education
(CCBHE) collects the most comprehensive information on unionization among
colleges and universities. Using 2010 data provided by CCBHE I construct a
dummy variable if any subgroup of faculty (full-time, part-time, or adjuncts) are
represented by a union at the institution (1=union, 0=nonunion).
Republican control over government. A political measure created by merging
data on the partisan character of each state government. The variable is a
variation on the Ranney index and measures the percentage of state institutions
(assembly, senate, and executive) controlled by the Republican Party. Thus if the
Republican Party controls only one house of government the variable is .33, two
houses is .66, and two houses plus the governorship is 1. This variable varies
over time.
Economic context. As an indicator of state economic performance, I use per
capita state Gross Domestic Product from the Bureau of Economic Analysis at the
Department of Commerce. The variable varies over time.
Regulatory Structure. Knott and Payne’s measures of regulatory strength and
centralization within higher education across states. Knott and Payne classify
each state into one of three categories: “highly regulated” (coded as a “3”) are
states with governing or coordinating board and strong regulatory powers;
“moderately regulated” (coded here as “2”) are states in which a coordinating
board exists with some regulatory powers; and “minimally regulated” (coded as
“1”) are states which have a coordinating board, advisory or planning agency with
few formal regulatory powers.
Partisan Structure. Combines Republican Control and Regulatory Structure. The
impact of partisan control may be particular powerful when regulatory system is
more centralized. This interactive variable thus combines partisan control of state
government with the Knott and Payne’s measure of regulatory strength.
The next sections turn to the empirical analysis of unionization’s impact on university
performance.
II. UNIONIZATION’S IMPACT ON EFFICIENCY

Policymakers and scholars disagree over the impact of unionization on
organizational efficiency. Some scholars argue that unionization weakens efficiency.
Economists, for example, argue that by creating a cartel, unionized workers secure
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artificially high wages that contribute to higher costs and lower efficiency (Marlow 2013;
Vedder, Denhardt, and Robe 2012; see also Riley 2011). Political scientists and
sociologists critical of unionization argue that public sector labor unions accrue unfair
influence in the political process and use their power to shape elections in favor of
policies that support unions at the expense of the public’s interest (Moe 2006). Other
scholars take an opposing view pointing out that internationally, countries with higher
unionization rates enjoy higher productivity than those with lower unionization rates
(Metcalf 2003). Some economists suggest that by democratizing the labor force unions
lead to more productive organizations in part because greater discretion is allocated to
employees nearest to the client or customer (Addison 2005: Wolff 2012). Finally,
organizational scholars note that unions reduce turnover, reduce inequality within the
organization, increase job satisfaction, and increase employees’ commitment to an
organization’s mission; all factors linked to higher efficiency.
Four Models of Efficiency. To measure unionization’s impact on university
efficiency I first model direct educational costs and core expense – two different
measures of a university’s budget described earlier. The two models use the following
equation:
( )
( )
(

)

where Y is a measure of direct instructional costs or core expenses for public four-year
institutions adjusted for inflation and the cost-of-living differences between states. The
log of both measures is used in order to pull outlying data from a positively skewed
distribution closer to the bulk of the data, and to have the variable be normally distributed.
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Since the budgets of one year are often used to set the following year’s budget, a oneyear lag of the dependent variable is included in the equation. Dummy variables for
each year are included to control for exogenous time factors.
To assess unionization’s potential impact on changes in budgets, I also model the
impact of unionization on the annual change in direct educational costs and core expenses.
The two change models use the following equation:
( )
(

)

where Y is annual percentage change ( [(Yn-Yn-1)/Y(n-1)] * 100 ) in the direct
instructional costs or core expenses for public four-year institutions adjusted for inflation
and the cost-of-living differences between states. Because percentage change is affected
by the size of the variable, I include the absolute value for direct educational cost and
core expenses in the equation. Year dummies are again included to control exogenous
time-related factors.
Hypotheses. Labor costs are the largest expense for any university. If critics of
unionization are correct, we would expect unionized institutions to be less efficient than
institutions that are not unionized. That is, all thing being equal, the budgets of unionized
schools should be higher than non-unionized institutions. A second hypothesis is that
given their emphasis on cost-cutting over revenue generation, one would expect schools
in Republican-dominated state governments to have lower expenditures than school in
states where Republicans are less dominant. Also, one would expect wealthier states (as
measured by per capita GDP) to have the flexibility and capacity to spend more on public
universities than poorer states. Third, one would expect the size of the institution and
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selectivity to be positively associated with school expenditures, i.e. the more selective a
school and the larger a school the more costly it is likely to be. Finally, Partisan
Structure combines Knott and Payne’s institutional control variable with Republican
control of state government. The expectation is that in states that are high centralized and
highly Republican, one would expect greater cuts in higher education and lower core
expenses.
Table 1 here
Results. The results of the analysis across four models suggest that unionization
is positively associated with efficiency. The results are presented in Table 1. The union
coefficients for the two budgetary variables are negative and statistically significant even
after controlling for last year’s budget. This means that a positive change in the union
status of a university on average reduces a university’s direct educational costs and core
expenses. Similar results occur when examining the impact of unionization on the rate of
change in direct instructional costs and core expenses. Unionization, on average,
contributes to a nearly one percent reduction in the growth of core expenses and
educational costs.
The relationship between the control variables and the dependent variables are
largely as expected. The selectivity of an institution is statistically significant and
negatively related to the two budget measures, i.e. as the institution becomes less
selective (higher proportion of applicants are admitted) the cost and expenses of an
institution decline. At the same time, the relationship of selectivity to a change in costs
and expenses is not statistically significant. Size also matters. Larger institutions are
more costly and expensive than institutions with fewer students.
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Political, economic, and administrative variables demonstrate mixed results.
There is a negative and statistically significant relationship in three of four models
between Republican control of government, suggesting that Republican-controlled state
governments contribute to lower instructional cost and lower core expenses. Per capita
GDP is positively related and statistically significant in three of four models, suggesting
support for the hypothesis that public universities in wealthier states spend more than
schools in poorer states. And finally in one of the models, “Partisan Structure” the
interactive variable connecting Republican control with Knott and Payne’s institutional
variable is positively related to budgets and statically significant.

III. UNIONIZATION’S IMPACT ON EFFECTIVENESS
In addition to claiming that unions drive up costs and lower efficiency, critics of
unionization argue that unions undermine effectiveness. Some economists argue that
unions impose rigid hiring and promotion rules that limit an organization’s flexibility and
keep unproductive employees in their jobs. Teachersunionexposed.com, one of a number
of anti-union lobbying organizations, captures the view:
America’s teachers unions — particularly the National Education Association and
the American Federation of Teachers — are the most organized and powerful
voices in education politics. These unions continue to block reforms needed to
improve our nation’s schools by putting their focus on teachers rather than on the
students they teach.
An opposing view is also found in academic research. Scholars note that unions improve
working conditions, accountability, wages, and transparency – all factors linked to more
effective organizational outcomes. Indeed, it is precisely when reforms are needed that
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unions help ensure that change will not be arbitrary or capricious. Diane Ravitch, a
senior fellow at the Brooking Institution, captures the view:
The union is thus necessary as a protection for teachers against the arbitrary
exercise of power by heavy-handed administrators. In our school systems, as in
our city, state, and federal governments, we need checks and balances. Just as the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government all act as checks on
each other, we need checks and balances in our school systems.
http://www.aft.org/newspubs/periodicals/ae/winter0607/ravitch.cfm
Thus, as with efficiency, scholars differ on the impact of unionization on effectiveness
which, in turn, contributes to different expectations about the impact of unions in higher
education.
Three Models of Effectiveness. As noted above, there are many ways to
measure effectiveness. Fortunately, the Delta Cost Project data include a complete set of
commonly used outcome measures for the time period of this analysis. To measure
unionization’s impact on university effectiveness I select three different dependent
variables: 1) graduation rate of students who finish within 150 percent of normal time; 2)
# of degree award per 100 FTEs; and 3) # of completions per 100 FTEs.

The dependent

variables are then modeled using the following equation:
( )
( )
(

)

where Y is the outcome variable.
Hypotheses. If critics of unionization are correct one should expect universities
with unions to perform worse than universities that do not have unions. That is, all things
being equal, unionized schools should have lower graduation rates, degrees awarded, and
completions. One would also expect other control variables to influence educational
outcomes. One would expect more selective institutions to perform better than less
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selective institutions. One might expect wealthier states to generate more effective
university outcomes. At the same time, it’s less clear how the size of an institution, the
partisan composition of state government, or the type of regulatory system might
influence the effectiveness of public universities.
Table 2 here

Results. The results are presented in Table 2. The analysis finds little support for
the view that unions hinder a university’s effectiveness. On the contrary, unionization is
positively associated with graduate rates, degrees awarded and completions and the
relationship is statistically significant. Unionization, for example, leads to a nearly 1
percent increase in the graduation rate of a school and is linked to an additional
completion and degree for every 100 students. High selectivity contributes to higher
graduation rates and a greater number of degrees and completions. Larger institutions
are associated with slightly higher graduation rates but lower number of degrees and
completions. Wealthier states, measured in terms of per capita GDP, contribute to a
larger number of degrees and completions, and better graduation rates. The variable
Partisan Structure which combines Republican*Regulatory Structure is negatively
associated with degrees awarded and completions but positively associated with
graduation rates.

IV. CONCLUSION: EMPHASIS ON INSTRUCTION OVER ADMINISTRATION
The central findings of this research are provocative and run against the grain of
some common expectations concerning the influence of unions on university budgets and
performance. The analysis finds that unions contribute to a more efficient and effective
university. Unionized institutions show lower costs and expenses even after controlling
15
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for the previous year’s budget. In addition, the rate of cost increases is lower in
unionized institutions. At the same time, unionization is positively linked to higher
graduation rates, and a higher number of completions and degrees. The results, while
significant, raise more questions than they answer. What contributes to these outcomes?
What are unions doing that leads to lower costs and better performance?
The Delta Cost Project dataset does not allow for a micro-level examination of
how unions influence university policies. Qualitative analysis may be needed to discern
the organizational mechanisms at play at various institutions. However, two measures in
the dataset offer a window into a possible answer. One measure “Instruction share,”
captures the share of education and related spending on instruction. A second measure,
“Administration share” captures the portion of spending on academic support,
institutional support, and operations and maintenance ascribed to the education function.
To the degree that budgets reflect priorities, the budgetary share for administration and
instruction offer a snapshot over time of what the university believes is the appropriate
balance between administration and instruction. That balance may provide an answer to
the puzzle posed by this research.
Benjamin Ginsberg’s book The Fall of the Faculty: the Rise of the AllAdministrative University and Why It Matters (Oxford University Press, 2011) analyzes
the sharp rise in administration at universities. Between 1975 and 2005 the number of
faculty grew by 51 percent while during that same time, administrators and
administrative staffers grew 85 percent and 240 percent, respectively (p. 25). The spike
in administration affects university performance in two important ways: one, as the share
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of administrators to faculty rises, university budget become bloated since administrators
are typically paid well above the average faculty member. Ginsberg notes:
Administrative salaries are on the rise everywhere in the nation. By 2007, the
median salary paid to the president of a doctoral degree-granting institution was
$325,000. . . Somewhat more difficult to explain is the fact that by 2010, even
some of the ubiquitous and largely interchangeable deanlets and deanlings earned
six-figure salaries. (p. 25).
In addition to higher costs, the administration-dominated university is characterized by
poor performance partly because administrators often lack substantive expertise in areas
in which they exercise control and partly because administrators rarely remain at the
institution for more than five years. Kent State University, for example, has had six
Deans of Arts and Sciences since I arrived in 1996. The current office holder is an
interim dean, hired after the preceding interim dean took another job elsewhere.
Ginsberg writes:
College administrators are usually better at inventing or seizing control of
activities than managing them effectively. When administrators take control of a
program from the faculty they often ruin it, since they typically know far less
about the program and less commitment to it than its original faculty directors.”
(pp. 35-36).
In short, Ginsberg’s research suggests one possible explanation for why costs and
budgets might rise at a university while performance falters: the heavy mix of
administration to faculty. The question is whether unionization, a variable Ginsberg does
not include in his analysis, plays a role in shaping the balance between administration and
instruction on campus. To address the question I use two models built around a similar
set of control variables used in earlier analyses:
( )
( )
(

)
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where Y is the percentage of the education-related spending devoted to: 1) instruction
and 2) administration.
The central hypothesis is that unionized institutions faculty play a more central
role in managing the university. Indeed, much of what is negotiated in a collective
bargaining agreement centers on issues of governance. Thus, in unionized institutions I
expect a higher percentage of the education-related budget to be devoted to instruction
than in non-unionized institutions. Relatedly, in unionized institutions I expect a lower
percentage of the education-related budget to be devoted to administration than in nonunionized institutions.
Table 3 here
Results. The analysis in Table 3 reveals that unionization has a statistically significant
impact on the budgetary mix between administration and instruction. Unionization leads
universities to emphasize instruction over administration. The budgetary share of
administration declines by .5 percent with unionization. At the same time, unionization
leads to a one percent increase in the instructional share of the budget. One can see the
relationship graphically in Figures X and Y.
Figure 2 Here
Figure 2 compares the mean share of administration between unionized and nonunionized schools over time for all four-year public institutions. The graph illustrates that
at no point have unionized institutions devoted more of their budget to administration
than non-unionized institutions. Moreover, the difference is typically two to three
percent; a sizeable amount given that university budgets can often exceed $500 million.
Figure 3 Here
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Figure 3 compares the mean share of instruction between unionized and nonunionized schools over time for all four-year public institutions. The graph illustrates
that the overall share of resources devoted to instruction as declined over time. At the
same time, unionized schools consistently devote a much higher proportion of their
budget to instruction than non-unionized schools. And again, the difference can be as
high as four percent. Were one to break out the comparisons of administration and
instruction by the size of school it is likely that differences between union and non-union
institutions would be even greater for the medium and larger institutions.
In sum, this research began with one puzzle and ended with another. The paper
began with the question Kim Cameron posed nearly 25 years ago: What impact does
unionization have on university performance? The empirical analysis included several
measures of university performance that reflected values of efficiency and effectiveness.
Based on the experience of 432 public four-year institutions over 23 years, I find that
unionization improves efficiency and effectiveness. Unionization contributes to lower
budgets, higher graduation rates, and a greater number of degrees and completions.
These finding prompted the further question: How is it possible to have a less costly
institution with better outcomes?
There are likely to be numerous ways in which unions affect the costs and quality
of a university. Most of the linkages, however, require more in-depth qualitative studies.
The Delta Cost Project Data, however, included information on the budgetary mix of
administration and instruction. Drawing on the work of Benjamin Ginsberg and others I
considered what role if any unionization plays in influencing the share of university
resources that are devoted to administration and instruction. Not surprisingly,
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unionization is positively related to a higher percentage of the budget devoted to
instruction and lower percentage to administration. What makes this finding particularly
interesting is that it suggests union influence on university performance may be indirect
as well as direct. In other words unions may influence how universities perform by
influencing the university’s priorities regarding instruction and administration.
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Table 1: Unionization’s Impact on Higher Education Budgets

Variables
Union
Selectivity of Institution
Size of Institution
Republican Control of State Gov.
Knott and Payne Structural Controls
State GDP Per Capita
Carnegie 2005
Lagged Dependent Variable
Original Budget Variable
Partisan Structure
Year dummy variables 1-23
Constant
Groups
Observations
Within R2
Between R2
Overall R2

Log of
university
instructional
costs
-0.00798***
-0.0178***
0.0111***
-0.0206***
-0.0017
7.44e-07***
-0.00085

Annual rate
of change in
university
instructional
costs
-0.9774***
-0.0347
-0.1647
-2.7930**
-0.2560
0.000064*
-0.0821039

0.9851***

Log of core
expenses

Annual rate
of change in
core
expenses

-0.00566***
-0.0162***
0.0103***
-0.0027
-0.000078
1.06e-06***
-0.00053

-0.7746***
0.063
-0.2295*
-0.8706*
-0.0159
0.00008***
-0.0548

0.9831***
1.08e-09*

1.43e-09*

0.0048*

0.5665141

0.000064

0.0821

0. .2816***

3.8328

0.2915***

1.9532

432
9461
0.9790
0.9998
0.9963

432
9461
0.1017
0.0220
0.0989

432
9461
0.9857
0.9998
0.9969

432
9461
0.0945
0.0243
0.0914

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Table 2: Unionization’s Impact on Higher Education Outcomes

Variables
Union
Selectivity of Institution
Size of Institution
Republican Control of State Gov.
Knott and Payne Structural Controls
State GDP Per Capita
Carnegie 2005
Partisan Structure
Constant
Groups
Observations
Within R2
Between R2
Overall R2

Degrees per
100 FTEs

Completion
per 100 FTEs

Graduation
Rate

0.5472**
-3.3217**
-0.3780***
1.4408***
0.0372
0.0001***
-0.8258***
-0.4013***
23.2487***
432
9892
0.1075
0.1812
0.1617

0.6987***
-3.2207**
-0.3492***
1.3520***
0.0668
0.0001***
-0.7889***
-0.3706***
22.9711***
432
9892
0.1799
0.2084
0.2003

0.0158*
-0.1694***
0.0101***
-0.0366***
-0.0083
4.25e-06***
-0.0126***
0.0129***
0.4332***
429
3396
0.0376
0.1774
0.1667

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table 3: Share of educational budgets spent on administration
and instruction

Variables
Union
Selectivity of Institution
Size of Institution
Republican Control of State Gov.
Knott and Payne Structural
Controls
State GDP Per Capita
Carnegie 2005
Partisan Structure
Year 1-23

https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss8/4
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Administration
Share of
Educational
Costs

Instructional
Share of
Educational
Costs

-0.0047*
-0.1058***
-0.0086***
-0.0037

0.00976***
0.0952***
0.0106***
0.00036

-0.0012

0.0004

-1.10e-07
0.0120***
0.00341***

-6.89e-08
-0.0162***
-0.00429***
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Constant
Groups
Observations
Within R2
Between R2
Overall R2

0.4234***

0.4897***

432

432

9894
0.0223
0.3335
0.2799

9894
0.0751
0.3611
0.3198

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Appendix 1

Variable

Observations Mean

Standard
Deviation

Description and Source

Core Expenses

11847

1.78e+08

3.19e+08

University
Instructional Costs

11939

1.08e+08

1.77e+08

Administration Share

11814

0.3473522 0.0847561

Instructional Share

11806

0.5581084 0.0984689

Total education and general
expenditures includes all core operating
expenditures, including sponsored
research, but excluding auxiliary
enterprises. This variable was
originally reported in IPEDS, but for
recent years it is calculated by
summing expenditures on instruction,
research, public service, academic
support, student services, institutional
support, operations and maintenance,
and scholarships and fellowships.
Source: Delta Cost Project
Total education and general
expenditures includes all core operating
expenditures, including sponsored
research, but excluding auxiliary
enterprises. This variable was
originally reported in IPEDS, but for
recent years it is calculated by
summing expenditures on instruction,
research, public service, academic
support, student services, institutional
support, operations and maintenance,
and scholarships and fellowships.
Source: Delta Cost Project
The share of education and related
spending on other education and
related costs (the portion of spending
on academic support, institutional
support, and operations and
maintenance ascribed to the education
function).
Source: Delta Cost Project
The share of education and related
spending on instruction.
Source: Delta Cost Project

Total degrees per
100fte

11922

22.28943

Total Completions
per 100fte

11925

12.324

The total number of degrees granted per
100 full time equivalent students enrolled.

Source: Delta Cost Project
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23.39101

24.08849

The total number of completions (awards,
certificates, and degrees) granted per 100
full time equivalent students enrolled.
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Variable

Observations Mean

Standard
Deviation

Description and Source
Source: Delta Cost Project

Graduation Rate

3734

0.4663928 0.1615311

Percentage of full-time, first-time,
degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate
students graduating within 150 percent of
normal time. Normal Time to Completion The amount of time necessary for a student
to complete all requirements for a degree
or certificate according to the institution's
catalog. This is typically 4 years (8
semesters or trimesters, or 12 quarters,
excluding summer terms) for a bachelor's
degree in a standard term-based institution;
2 years (4 semesters or trimesters, or 6
quarters, excluding summer terms) for an
associate's degree in a standard term-based
institution; and the various scheduled times
for certificate programs.
Source: Delta Cost Project

Unionized

12038

0.3267154 0.4690317

State Control

12038

0.427268

Selectivity

9945

0.6669668 0.176803

Carnegie 2005

11841

18.71556

National Center for the Study of
Collective Bargaining in Higher
Education and the Professions ,
http://www.hunter.cuny.edu/ncscbhep
Vanderbilt University, State Politics
and Judiciary Code Book 1987-2005,
The Council of State Governments,
Book of States 2005-2009
Total admission/Total Applications.
Sources: Delta Cost Project
The 2005 Carnegie Classification
includes all colleges and universities in
the United States that are degreegranting and accredited by an agency
recognized by the U.S. Secretary of
Education. The 2005edition classifies
institutions based on their degreegranting activities from the fall of 2003
through the spring of 2004.
1 = Associate's--Public Rural-serving
Small; 2 = Associate's--Public Ruralserving Medium; 3 = Associate's-Public Rural-serving Large; 4 =
Associate's--Public Suburban-serving
Single Campus; 5 = Associate's--Public
Suburban-serving Multicampus; 6 =
Associate's--Public Urban-serving

0.3397763

3.55856
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Variable

Observations Mean

Standard
Deviation

Description and Source
Single Campus; 7 = Associate's--Public
Urban-serving Multicampus; 8 =
Associate's--Public Special Use; 9 =
Associate's--Private Not-for-profit; 10
= Associate's--Private For-profit; 11 =
Associate's--Public 2-year colleges
under 4-year universities
12 = Associate's--Public 4-year
Primarily Associate's; 13 = Associate's-Private Not-for-profit 4-year Primarily
Associate's; 14 = Associate's--Private
For-profit 4-year Primarily Associate's;
15 = Research Universities (very high
research activity); 16 = Research
Universities (high research activity); 17
= Doctoral/Research Universities:
Doctorate-granting Universities.; 18 =
Master's Colleges and Universities
(larger programs); 19 = Master's
Colleges and Universities (medium
programs); 20 = Master's Colleges and
Universities (smaller programs); 21 =
Baccalaureate Colleges--Arts &
Sciences; 22 = Baccalaureate Colleges-Diverse Fields; 23 =
Baccalaureate/Associate's Colleges; 24
= Special Focus Institutions-Theological seminaries, Bible colleges,
and other faith-related institutions; 25 =
Special Focus Institutions--Medical
schools and medical centers; 26 =
Special Focus Institutions--Other
health professions schools; 27 =
Special Focus Institutions--Schools of
engineering; 28 = Special Focus
Institutions--Other technology-related
schools; 29 = Special Focus
Institutions--Schools of business and
management; 30 = Special Focus
Institutions--Schools of art, music, and
design; 31 = Special Focus Institutions-Schools of law; 32 = Special Focus
Institutions--Other special-focus
institutions ; 33 = Tribal Colleges; 0 =
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Variable

Observations Mean

Standard
Deviation

Description and Source
Not classified; -3 = Not applicable, not
in Carnegie universe (not accredited or
nondegree-granting)

Size

12038

3.010052

1.419309

Knott and Payne

12038

2.672371

1.138561

Cost-of-Living
Adjustment

12038

78.17978

17.34694

State GDP Per Capita

12038

33372.37

8702.626

Source: Delta Cost Project
Categorical variable. Divides annual
FTE data in to five quintiles.
Source: Delta Cost Project
Categorial variable that measures the
degree of centralization in state
regulatory system for higher education.
Sources: Knott and Payne
William Berry,
http://mailer.fsu.edu/~wberry/garnetwberry/a.html
Bureau of Economic Analysis
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